Brooke Gong, also Baichuan Gong

Hi, I’m Brooke Gong. Security engineer turned AI security engineer.

I graduated from Carnegie Mellon University School of Computer Science in December 2025 with an M.S. in Information Technology, Privacy Engineering, after a B.Eng. in Information Security from Huazhong University of Science and Technology in 2023. In December 2026 I start as an infrastructure software engineer at an AI security company. I care about agent security, adversarial machine learning, privacy engineering, and AI-native engineering workflows.

About

From security engineering to AI security to ML infrastructure.

I started on the security engineering side. In 2023 I interned on the cybersecurity team at BMW Brilliance Automotive, where I did penetration testing and code audit. In a double-blind exercise I worked on the attacking side with the external audit team.

At Carnegie Mellon I moved into AI security research. I studied how agents fail when a safe model is wired into tools and multi-step plans, how adversarial perturbations transfer across vision-language models, and how large language models can automate privacy threat analysis. I am now moving into machine learning infrastructure.

  • M.S. in Information Technology, Privacy Engineering, Carnegie Mellon University School of Computer Science, graduated December 2025
  • B.Eng. in Information Security, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, 2023
  • Starting December 2026 as an infrastructure software engineer at an AI security company

Work

Research and projects, newest first.

CMU capstoneAug to Dec 2025

Securing Multimodal Agents in the Wild

I formulated the action gap, the distance between model-level and agent-level safety. I built a multi-step document-analysis agent that records action-level execution traces in MLflow, then ran attacks across six categories (direct, indirect, prompt, context, tool, hybrid) on an AgentHarm subset scored by an LLM judge. Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct and GPT-4.1-mini ran under identical agent logic. Stronger model-level refusal did not imply agent-level safety. GPT-4.1-mini refused more objectives yet had higher attack success under adaptive attacks, 45.7% against 37.5%, and per-action attack success reached 0.84.

ResearchMay to Aug 2025

Adversarial examples against vision-language models

My research on the adversarial side, attacks on vision-language models. The idea is a reversible adversarial perturbation that protects image privacy from vision-language models while remaining recoverable. My part was the cross-prompt transfer evaluation. I tested whether perturbations built against one prompt still work on unseen prompts across BLIP-2, InstructBLIP and OpenFlamingo.

CMU Software and Societal Systems DepartmentApr 2025 to present

UsersFirst privacy threat taxonomy and LLM automation

UsersFirst is a consumer privacy threat taxonomy with 4 categories, 19 threat types and 28 leaf threats. I decomposed it into individually decidable subtasks so that large language models can run parts of the analysis. I designed the ground-truth datasets and evaluation rubrics for those subtasks and wrote case-study threat analyses.

usersfirst.io

CMU course projectMar to May 2025

Gender bias in large language models

I audited GPT-4o and Llama-3.1-Instruct with Big Five personality profiles under gendered-name prompts. I measured stereotype alignment, empirical alignment and bias amplification. GPT-4o amplified stereotypical gaps, and both models produced unrealistically narrow trait distributions.

Qiyuan Lab, AI security research internMay to Aug 2024

LLM security testing platform

A desktop application for testing large language models against membership-inference attacks. The platform was mine end to end, and the attack research was the team’s. I built the application around those attacks and added a JavaScript analysis view that shows how attack outcomes shift across fine-tuning configurations and auxiliary-set choices.

HUST National Cybersecurity CenterJun to Sep 2023

IRS-aided task offloading in digital twin edge networks

A federated deep reinforcement learning algorithm for IRS-aided task offloading in digital twin edge networks. Published as Y. Dai, J. Wu, J. Zhao, B. Gong, Y. Lu, IEEE VTC2023-Fall.

Writing

Notes on building an AI-native way of working.

All posts

Harness

How I work with AI agents.

I keep a personal AI harness repository. It holds my rules, my Claude Code configuration, skills, and the hand-off files that connect one session to the next.

Every rule has one source and exports into each tool I use. This site is the first project built with that workflow.

Tools today

  • Claude Code (desktop app)
  • GitHub
  • Vercel
  • Orca (trying it)
  • Typeless for voice input
  • The harness repository is private for now.

Principles I adopted

  1. 01Rules are minimal and machine-enforced where possible. Every rule that can be checked by a script is a script.
  2. 02One source of truth, linked everywhere else.
  3. 03Plan before acting. Tests alongside code. Documents record results, not process.
  4. 04Sessions are stateless, so each session ends with a hand-off file the next one starts from.
  5. 05Verify through the real entry point, not partial tests.
  6. 06External solutions before building my own.